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Abstract: To understand the investment behavior of venture capital (VC) investors, this 
paper estimates a dynamic model of learning. Behavior reflecting both learning from past 
investments (exploitation) and anticipated future learning (exploration) are found to be 
prevalent, and the model’s additional predictions about success rates and investment 
speeds are confirmed empirically. Learning is important, since it can create informational 
frictions, and it has potential implications for VCs’ investments and organizations. VCs 
are found to internalize the value of learning, and this may help promote exploration 
beyond the levels sustained in standard capital markets, which is socially valuable.   
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Given their importance for financing high-tech start-ups, venture capitalists (VCs) have 
substantial impact on innovation and development of new technologies. While a great 
deal has been written about the relationship between VCs and their portfolio companies,
1
less is known about VCs’ decisions to invest in particular companies.
2 An important 
determinant of investment decisions is the information VCs gain about new technologies 
and investment opportunities, and this “learning” provides a natural starting point for 
understanding their investment behavior. This paper presents and estimates a dynamic 
model of investor learning based on the multi-armed bandit model. In this model 
investors balance the benefit of exploring new investments to learn about their returns 
against the opportunity cost of investments with more certain immediate returns, and the 
model is estimated with data for VCs’ investments in U.S. entrepreneurial companies. 
The results show that VCs both invest in companies where they expect high immediate 
returns and make explorative investments in companies with lower immediate returns, 
but where the information gained helps guide future investments. The model generates 
additional predictions, and these are confirmed empirically. More profitable investments, 
as measured by the model, are made faster, and VCs that explore more have higher 
success rates. These findings provide additional supporting evidence for the model. 
Overall, the primary contribution is to document the presence of learning. The hypothesis 
that VCs’ investments are chosen independently to maximize the return from each 
1 See, for example, Gorman and Sahlman (1989), Sahlman (1990), Lerner (1995), Gompers and Lerner 
(1999), Hellmann and Puri (2000), Hellmann and Puri (2002), Kaplan and Strömberg (2004), and 
Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Lu (2006). 
2 Notable exceptions are Kaplan and Strömberg (2004) and Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein 
(2005). 3
individual investment, as assumed in standard models of capital markets, is clearly 
rejected. An additional contribution is methodological. To demonstrate the presence of 
learning, the paper develops a novel identification result for the dynamic learning model. 
This result relies on a statistical index result and demonstrates how to empirically 
distinguish behavior reflecting learning from past experience (exploitation) from 
behavior reflecting anticipated future learning (exploration). The index result also 
simplifies the estimation of the model and provides a more transparent empirical 
approach, which may also be applicable to other situations with learning.
Learning is important since it can create informational frictions. For example, 
when learning is costly and investors observe signals generated by other investors, a free-
riding problem arises (see Bolton and Harris (1999) and Keller, Rady and Cripps (2005)). 
This problem arises when VCs have an incentive to reduce their own investments in 
learning, knowing they can free-ride on the information created by other investors, and 
this may reduce the overall exploration and learning in equilibrium. Learning may also 
lead to an informational cascading problem.
3 When other VCs’ actions are observable, 
each VC’s decision depends both on the privately learned signals and the other investors’ 
publicly observable actions. When the other investors’ actions are more informative 
relative to a VC’s private signal, each VC’s own action will depend more heavily on the 
publicly observed actions and less on the investor’s own private signal. Hence, less new 
information is incorporated into the actions and they become less informative, leading to 
3 Devenow and Welch (1996) and in particular Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) present excellent overviews of 
the extensive literature about informational herding. More recently, Amador and Weill (2006) present an 
explicit model of the problem of slowing learning with public and private signals as described here. 4
less informed decisions. In the limit, when investors base their decisions entirely on 
publicly observable actions, no new information is incorporated into these actions, and 
learning stops entirely. Focusing on the period 1995-2000, Goldfarb, Kirsch and Miller 
(2007) present indirect evidence of such an informational cascade for VC investors.  
Both of these frictions reduce the equilibrium level of exploration and learning, 
and both frictions arise from informational spillovers in markets with learning. However, 
VC firms are organized as limited partnerships, investing in privately held companies, 
and being very reluctant to disclose information about their current investments and 
performance. This reduces informational spillovers, and it may allow VCs to internalize 
the value of learning, potentially promoting overall exploration and learning beyond the 
levels that would be sustained in a more transparent capital market. Promoting learning is 
socially valuable, and it may present an additional source of value created by VCs. Their 
ability to internalize the value of learning also suggests that VCs are particularly suited 
for investing in companies with greater potential for learning, such as high-tech 
companies developing new technologies or new business ideas. Consistent with this, 
Kortum and Lerner (2000) find that VCs account for as much as 8 to 14% of all U.S. 
innovative activity.
The empirical learning model is based on the multi-armed bandit model. This 
model dates back to Robbins (1952), and the name refers to a gambler facing a number of 
slot machines (one-armed bandits). The gambler is uncertain about the distributions of 
payouts from these machines, but learns about these distributions while playing. The 
gambler is concerned about finding the optimal gambling strategy, but the return from 5
each gamble is two-fold. The gambler receives both the immediate payoff of each gamble 
and an option value of learning, since more information helps improve future gambles. 
The optimal strategy trades off exploiting machines with known payoffs and exploring
machines with less certain payoffs but a higher value of information.
4 In the words of 
Berry and Fristedt (1985), “it may be wise to sacrifice some potential early payoff for the 
prospect of gaining information that will allow for more informed choices later.” 
Bergemann and Valimaki (2006) present a brief survey of the literature about 
bandit models. In the theoretical literature, Rothschild (1974) uses the bandit model to 
model firms’ experimentation with prices to learn about uncertain demand. Weitzman 
(1979) analyzes a model of the optimal sequencing of research projects. In venture capital 
Bergemann and Hege (1998) and Bergemann and Hege (2005) present models of staged 
financing based on the bandit model. They address the question of how and for how long 
a VC should finance an entrepreneur given the potential for learning about the quality of 
the project. Empirically, Jovanovic (1979) and Miller (1984) estimate bandit models of 
job turnover in which workers learn about job specific skills. Erdem and Keane (1996), 
Crawford and Shum (2005) and Hitsch (2006) estimate models of firms’ experimentation 
with prices and products to learn about uncertain demand.
5 Their empirical approaches 
are based on numerically intensive estimation procedures to solve the dynamic 
programming problem inherent in the learning model. In contrast, the empirical method 
4 The terms exploration and exploitation are introduced by March (1991) in the context of organizational 
learning.
5 Starting from Arrow (1962) there is also a substantial literature about learning by doing. In this literature 
learning is a costless byproduct of an activity and the trade-off between exploration and exploitation does 
not arise. Recent finance studies of learning-by-doing include Linnainmaa (2006) and Pastor, Taylor and 
Veronesi (2006).  6
presented below is numerically simple and transparent, while maintaining the essential 
features of the problem. 
To keep the analysis tractable, it is based on a simple learning model, which 
presents a somewhat simplified view of VCs’ investments. The formal model assumes a 
stationary environment where investors only learn from their own past investments, 
projects arrive exogenously, and learning happens immediately. These assumptions are 
stylized but necessary for the theoretical derivations, and the empirical analysis includes 
additional controls to assess the robustness of the results. More generally, empirical 
analyses of entrepreneurial companies face data limitations. These companies, by 
definition, have short operating and financial histories and little information is 
systematically observed about them. This means that classifications of companies and 
investment outcomes are necessarily crude, although common in the literature. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section presents the theoretical 
learning model and the important index result. The second section presents the data and 
the construction of the variables. Section three discusses the econometric implementation 
of the model, the statistical identification, and the choice of prior beliefs. Section four 
presents the empirical evidence of learning, and the final section concludes.7
I. The Multi-Armed Bandit Model 
The learning model presented here is a bandit model with an infinite horizon, 
geometric discounting, and independent Bernoulli arms.
6 Each period a VC invests in one 
company in a given industry. The VC is uncertain about the probability of a successful 
investment in the different industries, but has beliefs about those probabilities. The 
opportunity cost of investing in a project in a new and uncertain industry is that it 
prevents an investment in an industry with a more certain return. The outcome of each 
investment is either success or failure, it is immediately observed, and the VC’s beliefs 
are updated accordingly, using Bayes’ rule.  
Before going through the formal model, two particular features warrant separate 
discussions. First, the model captures several kinds of learning. The investor may learn 
about a specific ability to pick more successful companies and add value in individual 
industries, or the investor may learn about industry conditions more generally. At the 
industry level, learning may give rise to informational cascading problems, as discussed 
by Goldfarb, Kirsch and Miller (2007). At a finer level, investors may learn about 
individual entrepreneurs or technologies within each industry. The investor may then 
invest in a company developing a particular technology or introducing a new business 
idea in a particular market segment. If the company is successful, the investor learns 
about the viability of other applications of this technology or idea for future investments. 
At this level, learning is closely related to innovation and technological progress in the 
6 See Whittle (1982), Berry and Fristedt (1985), and Gittins (1989) for general discussions of this model. 8
spirit of Arrow (1969)’s statement that “[t]echnological progress is in the first instance 
the reduction in uncertainty.” Promoting exploration and learning is then equivalent to 
promoting innovation and technological progress, and at this finer level the free-rider 
problem may be a more important informational friction. The empirical analysis does not 
separate learning at the aggregate industry level from learning at finer levels, due to data 
and tractability issues, which are described below. The analysis is conducted at the 
industry level, but the results are consistent with learning taking place at finer levels as 
well. At all levels, learning has implications for the market for entrepreneurial finance, 
but separating and characterizing learning at various levels is left for future research.  
A further assumption is that the investor learns the outcome of an investment and 
updates the beliefs before making any subsequent investments. In the data, investments 
are made 48 days apart, on average, and while the assumption that all learning takes place 
within this period may not be entirely realistic, it is necessary for the theoretical model. 
In reality, investors learn gradually over the life of a project (see Bergemann and Hege 
(1998), Bergemann and Hege (2005), and Pastor, Taylor and Veronesi (2006)). Hence, 
final outcomes are always somewhat anticipated, and the alternative assumption that all 
the learning takes place at the time of the exit is equally stark. Empirically, the 
uncertainty about the timing of learning simply introduces noise in the estimates of the 
investors’ beliefs. This noise should make the empirical analysis less likely to find 
evidence of learning and it leads to perhaps more conservative estimates of the extent of 
learning in the market.  9
A. The Formal Model 
Each investor faces an infinite sequence of periods, t = 0, 1, … . At each time t,
the investor chooses between K arms where each arm represents an industry, denoted i = 
1, 2, … , K. An investment in industry i, at time t, is either successful or not, as 
represented by the random variable  () { 0 , 1 } i yt . The true success probability is denoted 
Pr[ ( ) 1] ii py t    . It is constant over time but may vary across arms and investors. The 
investor is uncertain about pi but has prior beliefs given by  (0) i F . These beliefs are 
updated after each investment, and the updated beliefs before investing at time t are 
() i Ft. These updated beliefs depend on the prior beliefs and the entire history of 
investments and outcomes up to time t. Naturally, the support of the distributions  (0) i F
and () i Ft is the interval from 0 to 1, representing all possible values of pi.
The investor’s strategy specifies the current investment decision as a function of 
the investment history. At time t the strategy is  ( ):{1,..., } {0,1} {1,..., }
tt st K K uo , the full 
strategy is  ^ ` (0), (1), (2),... Ssss   , and the investor’s problem is to choose the strategy 
that maximizes the total expected return. When G  is the discount rate, the investor’s 
problem can be stated as follows 
()
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Equivalently, the problem can be viewed as a dynamic programming problem, 
represented by the Bellman equation 10
 () ( ) 1,2,..., () m a x [ ()| ( ) ] [(( 1 ) ) | () , () ] st st K V Ft Ey t Ft EVFt Ft st G
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In this formulation, the state space contains the beliefs about success probabilities in 
different industries, and these beliefs develop according to the transition rules 
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Equation (3) states that the beliefs are unchanged unless an investment is made in an 
industry, and equation (4) reflects Bayesian updating of the beliefs about pi after 
investing in industry i and observing either  ( ) 1   i yt  (success) or  () 0 i yt   (failure). 
The Bellman formulation illustrates the fundamental trade-off in this model. The 
first term in equation (2) is the investor’s expected immediate return from investing in 
industry s(t), and the second term is the continuation value. Without learning, the 
continuation value would be independent of the current investment, and the optimal 
investment would simply be the one with the highest expected immediate return. With 
learning, the information gained from the current investment affects future investments, 
and the continuation value depends on this information. The continuation value increases 
for more informative investments, and this creates an additional option value of learning. 11
B. The Gittins Index 
Gittins and Jones (1974) solve a general version of the investor’s problem, and 
formulate the solution in terms of the Gittins index.This index can be calculated from the 
history of investments in each industry separately, and the investor’s optimal strategy is 
to invest in the industry with the highest value of the index. In other words, if vi(t) is the 
Gittins index for industry i, at time t, the index result states that the optimal strategy is 
1,...,




  . (5) 
To calculate the index, let W  denote a stopping time for investing in just industry i, and
Gittins (1979) derives the following expression for the index 
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where the supremum is taken over stopping times. Solving for the optimal stopping time 
involves solving a dynamic programming problem, but this problem is more tractable, 
since it is solved for each arm independently, and the state space contains only the beliefs 
for this particular arm.  
Still, there is no known closed form solution for the index. Gittins and Jones 
(1979) derive an illustrative approximation for the case where  0.75 G    and the prior 12
beliefs are Beta distributed.
7 While the Beta distribution is not required for the general 
index result, it is important for keeping the analysis tractable and is maintained below. 
With Beta distributed priors, Bayes’ rule implies that the updated beliefs are distributed 
(,) ii Beta a b  where  ,0 ii i aa r {  and  ,0 ii i i bb nr {  . Here, ri is the number of past 
successes, and ni is the total number of past investments in industry i. As ai and bi
increase, the mass of this distribution becomes concentrated at the empirical success rate, 
given by  /( ) ii i i aab O { , which equals the mean of the  (,) ii Beta a b  distribution. For this 
case Gittins and Jones (1979) approximate the Gittins index as 
1
(,)










where () i A O  and  () i B O  are non-negative tabulated functions. 
This approximation provides some insight into the determinants of the option 
value of learning. The total value of an investment is the value of the Gittins index. In 
equation (7), the first term in the expression for the index is  i O , which is the expected 
immediate return, since, with a binary outcome and the value of success normalized to 
one, [ | () ] ii Ey Ft   Pr[ 1| () ] ii yF t    [|( ) ] ii i Ep Ft O   . Clearly, the value the investment 
is at least this large. The second term is the value of the investment in excess of the 
immediate return, and this represents the option value of learning. This fraction is always 
7 The Beta(a,b) distribution has density 
11 ()








 for  0 a !  and  0 b ! , and its mean is 
a /(a b).13
positive, and the term (ai + bi) in the denominator equals  0, 0, ii i abn  . This means that, 
given i O , the option value tends to zero as ni increases. Intuitively, when the number of 
investments increases, the beliefs become more informed and concentrated around  i O ,
which approaches the true  i p , and the option value of learning vanishes. 
C. Discussion of Prior Beliefs, the Index Result, and the State Space 
The assumption of Beta distributed priors together with the index result make the 
state space more tractable and greatly simplify the problem. In principle, the bandit 
model is a dynamic programming problem, and it could be solved by standard methods, 
such as iterating the value or policy function (see Judd (1998)). However, these methods 
are only numerically feasible for problems with fairly small state spaces, and the 
representation of the investor’s beliefs requires a large space.  
The benefit of the Beta distribution is that it is closed under Bayesian updating. 
With Beta distributed prior beliefs and Bernoulli outcomes (a conjugate pair), the 
updated beliefs are also Beta distributed and are fully characterized by the two 
parameters of this distribution. In contrast, if the prior beliefs could follow any arbitrary 
distribution, the updated beliefs would also be arbitrary, and the state space would be 
correspondingly high-dimensional to represent this distribution (in principle, infinite-
dimensional). Hence, with six industries, the Beta distribution leads to a twelve-
dimensional state space, which is still numerically challenging. 
The benefit of the index result is that it separates the dynamic programming 
problem into separate problems for each industry. Calculating the Gittins index requires 14
solving the problem in equation (6), which is a dynamic programming problem with just 
a two-dimensional state space, which is quite tractable. For the empirical analysis, this 
problem is solved for each industry, at the time of each investment, and the resulting 
Gittins index is used to calculate the option value of learning for each of the investors’ 
potential investments.  
The advantages of this empirical approach is that it is simpler and the estimation 
and identification are more transparent relative to previous empirical studies of learning 
and experimentation (i.e. Crawford and Shum (2005), Erdem and Keane (1996), and 
Hitsch (2006)). The approach explicitly separates learning about the immediate return 
(exploitation) from the value of anticipated future learning (exploration). Further, as 
shown below, when the outcome of each investment is observed, these two kinds of 
learning are separately identified, and the model can also recover the investors’ prior 
beliefs. This identification result has not been previously established. In fact, Heckman 
(1991) shows that when only durations between changes in “arms” are observed (as is 
common when studying, for example, job-turnover), the model is unidentified and is 
unable to separate learning from individual heterogeneity. As argued below, when such 
duration data are supplemented with information about the outcomes of the individual 
experiments, as is the case here, this identification problem disappears. 
One limitation is that the empirical approach relies on the index result, and the 
index result only formally holds for a narrow class of learning models, which excludes, 
for example, switching costs (see Banks and Sundaram (1994)) and that the outcome of 
one arm is informative about the distribution of outcomes of other arms (however, see 15
Nash (1980)). Still, Duff and Barto (1997) argue that the strategy given by the index 
result for the Gittins index approximates the optimal strategy for more general Markov 
decision processes with learning. This should mitigate some concerns about minor 
misspecification of the model in the presence of switching costs or learning across arms, 
and it potentially opens for wider applications of this empirical approach. 
II. Data Description 
A. Sample
The data are provided by Sand Hill Econometrics (SHE) and contain the majority 
of VC investments in the U.S. in the period 1987 to 2005.
8 SHE combines and extends 
two commercially available databases, Venture Xpert (formerly Venture Economics) and 
VentureOne. These two databases are extensively used in the VC literature (i.e. Kaplan 
and Schoar (2005) and Lerner (1995)), and Gompers and Lerner (1999) and Kaplan, 
Sensoy and Strömberg (2002) investigate the completeness of the Venture Xpert data and 
find that they contain most VC investments and that missing investments tend to be the 
less significant ones. 
The sample is constructed as follows. First, the data are restricted to investments 
made before 2000, since it typically takes VC financed companies three to five years 
8 It may be a concern that only few companies go public after 2000. For robustness, the model is estimated 
restricting the sample to end in 2000, 1998, 1996, 1994, and 1992. The main results are robust across these 
sub periods. The signs and economic magnitudes of the main coefficients (unreported) are largely 
unchanged, and although the statistical significance is reduced with the smaller sample size, the main 
coefficients remain statistically significant. 16
after the initial investment to go public or be acquired, and the information about these 
outcomes is current as of 2005. It is common for multiple VCs to invest in the same 
company, and the sample contains these multiple investments by different VCs. Also, 
VCs typically stage their investments over multiple rounds, but the sample is restricted to 
each VC’s initial investment in a company, since the analysis focuses on learning from 
individual companies and the effect on subsequent investments in other companies. It 
would be interesting to refine the analysis to learning at the level of individual rounds, 
but the need to introduce round level outcome measures would complicate this analysis. 
Further, VCs that make less than 40 investments in the full sample are excluded, since 
their short investment histories make it difficult to draw inference about their learning 
and create convergence problems for the estimation procedure. This reduces the sample 
from 3,364 to 216 VCs and eliminates 50% of the companies. Not surprisingly, the 
remaining investors have higher success rates than the eliminated investors. The average 
success rate for the investors in the final sample is 50%, and the corresponding rate for 
the eliminated investors is only 39%. The final sample contains 19,166 investments in 
6,076 companies by 216 VC firms. 
The restriction of the sample to investors making more than 40 investments raises 
concerns about survivorship bias; however, this is less of a concern when studying 
learning than for studies of risk and return. When studying risk and return, the problem 
arises when funds with low returns stop operating or reporting, and funds with larger 
(typically also more volatile) returns will then be overrepresented in the data, biasing the 
estimates. This bias does not arise for inference about learning. As explained below, 
inference about learning is derived from the particular way past investments and their 17
outcomes relate to future investment decisions, and not from more volatile or profitable 
investments per se. If a fund makes random investments and happens to be successful 
and survive, the investment history will not reflect learning in a mechanical way. When 
investments are truly random, the estimates of learning are statistically insignificant, 
regardless of the volatility or relative success of these investments, and the selection of 
the sample does not cause learning to be statistically significant in a mechanical way. 
Still, another type of bias arises if the investors left in the sample learn more or 
differently than the excluded investors. The evidence below shows that investors that 
explore and learn more also have higher success rates, and if these investors also make 
more investments, this suggests that sample contains investors that learn more than the 
average VC investor. In this case, the results should be interpreted as providing evidence 
of learning for this particular group of investors. 
B. Variables
The primary observed variables are the sequence of VCs’ investments, their 
outcomes, and the industry classifications of the companies. These variables are used to 
construct each VC’s investment and learning history, and summary statistics are provided 
in table I. 
**** TABLE I ABOUT HERE **** 
Each company is classified as belonging to one of six industries. These are 
“health / biotechnology,” “communications / media,” “computer hardware / electronics,” 
“software,” “consumer / retail,” and “other.” The corresponding indicator variables are 18
Health, Communications, Computers, Software, Consumer, and Other.
9 The distribution 
of companies across these industries is presented in panels A and D of table I, and these 
six major industry classifications are aggregated from 25 minor classifications. This 
aggregation is necessary to get sufficiently long investment histories within each industry 
but is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. The intention is to classify companies into 
industries where experience in one industry in informative about subsequent investments 
in this industry but not across industries, as assumed in the bandit model. 
For each investment, the outcome is given by the binary variable Success, and for 
each investor the variable Success Rate measures the performance as the number of past 
successful investments divided by the total number of past investments. Each investment 
is classified as successful when the company eventually goes public or is acquired. This 
classification is consistent with VCs generating most of their returns from a few 
successful investments, but the measure is obviously a coarse outcome measure. Ideally, 
success should be measured in dollars or as a percentage return, but these numbers are 
not generally available in VC data, and the coarser measure is common in the literature. 
One concern is that companies that are acquired as part of their liquidation are classified 
as successful investments. To address this concern, Gompers and Lerner (2000) compare 
different success measures, including counting acquisitions as unsuccessful, and find all 
of these to be highly correlated. The results here are also largely unchanged when 
9 Since learning may be less pronounced for investments in the “other” category, the model is also 
estimated while excluding companies in this category. The empirical results (unreported) are unchanged. 19
classifying acquisitions as unsuccessful investments. In table I, panel B, the average 
success rate equals 50.3%, ranging from 13.3 to 86.4%. 
At the time of each investment, each company is classified as either an early-stage 
or a late-stage company, where late-stage corresponds to the company having regular 
revenues. The binary variable Stage equals one for late-stage companies, and 28.7% of 
the investments in the sample are in late-stage companies. 
In addition to learning from their own investments, investors may also learn from 
general public signals and market trends across industries. Although this learning is 
difficult to formally incorporate in the model, two variables are included to control for 
these effects. The variable Industry Investments contains the total number of VC 
investments in each industry in each year. It varies from 36 investments in “other” in 
1994 to 3,443 investments in “computer hardware / electronics” in 2000, and this variable 
summarizes broad underlying changes that affect the relative attractiveness of individual 
industries as reflected in the VCs’ overall concurrent investment patterns. Following 
Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2005), the variable Industry IPOs  contains 
the number of VC-backed companies going public in each industry during each year. 
Industries with more IPOs may represent more profitable investment opportunities, and 
VCs may be attracted to these opportunities. Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein 
(2005) find that this variable is an important determinant of VCs’ investments, and the 
results here confirm this finding. 20
C. Option Value and Expected Immediate Return 
For each investor, at the time of each investment, the expected immediate return 
and the option value of learning are calculated for each of the industries. Note that these 
variables depend on the updated beliefs about pi, but not on its true value, and pi is not 
assumed to be constant across investors or industries. 
Before calculating the updated beliefs, it is necessary to specify the investors’ 
prior beliefs. These beliefs are taken to be distributed Beta(ai,0, bi,0), with ai,0 = 1 and bi,0
= 19. This distribution can be interpreted as each investor having previously experienced 
one success and 19 failures. The particular choice of a0 and b0 is discussed in detail 
below, and the updated beliefs are calculated as follows. For investor j, let ri,j be the 
number of past successful investment and ni,j be the total number of investments in 
industry i. These are counted directly in the data. Now, define  ,, 0 , ij i ij aar {  and 
,, 0 , , ij i ij ij bbnr { , and it follows from Bayes’ rule that the updated beliefs are 
distributed ,, (,) ij ij Beta a b .
For each investment, the immediate expected return and the option value of 
learning are calculated. The immediate expected return is  ,, ,, ,, ,, /( ) ijt ijt ijt ijt aab O   . In 
table I, panel C, this rate is observed to equal 26.0% on average, varying between 3.2 and 
71.7%. For the option value, the discount factor is  0.99 G   , and since the average time 
between investments is 48 days, this discount factor corresponds to an annual discount 
rate of 8%. The results are robust to using discount factors  0.75 G    or  0.95 G   ,
corresponding to discount rates of 783% and 47%. Of these three choices,  0.99 G    leads 21
to the smallest coefficient on option value, and it may be considered a conservative 
choice. The option values are then calculated using a numerical algorithm from Gittins 
(1989).
10 In table I, the calculated Option Value equals 6.2% on average, ranging from 
1.9 to 8.2%. As a fraction of the total value of each investment, the option value varies 
from 3.1 to 53.1% with an average of 25.2%. 
III. Specification and Identification of Empirical Model 
In the empirical model the investment decision is modeled using a multinomial 
discrete choice model. The value of an investment in industry i, by investor j, at time t, is 
specified as 
,, ,, 1 ,, 2 ,, 3 ,, ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt v Option Value X OE E E H c    . (8) 
Here ,, ijt Q  is the total value of the investment,  ,, ijt O  is the immediate expected return, and
,, ijt Option Value  is the option value, calculated from the investment history as described 
above. The variable  ,, ijt X  contains additional controls, and the idiosyncratic shock, given 
by ,, ijt H , captures investor and investment specific shocks. The investor invests in the 
industry with the highest value of  ,, ijt Q , and the probability that investor j, given 
investment history histj, invests in industry i is denoted  () ij hist S . When  ,, ijt H  follows an 
10 A MatLab program for calculation of the index is available from the author. 22
i.i.d. extreme value distribution, the model is equivalent to the Multinomial Logit model 



















The likelihood function is the product of these probabilities, and E  is estimated directly 
using maximum likelihood. Note that in this model the scale of the coefficients is not 
identified, and the coefficients are normalized by fixing the variance of the error term. 
However, the relative magnitudes of the coefficients are identified. 
The coefficient  1 E  captures investors’ tendency to exploit. The model predicts 
that this coefficient is positive and significant, and a high value of  1 E  means that 
investors are more likely to invest in industries with higher expected immediate returns 
(i.e. higher O ). The coefficient  2 E  captures investors’ tendency to explore, and the 
model also predicts that this coefficient is positive. A higher value of  2 E  indicates that 
investors place more weight on the value of information and engage in more explorative 
behavior. Finally, the learning model predicts that  12 E E   , since the expected immediate 
returns and the value of learning weigh equally in the investors’ preferences. Below, this 
restriction is used to recover the investors’ prior beliefs, but first the statistical 
identification of the model is discussed. 23
A. Identification of Exploitation and Exploration 
With sufficient data,  () i hist S  is known for all investment histories, and the 
identification of explorative and exploitative learning follows from changes in this 
probability for different investment histories. Consider the three cases of (1) no learning, 
(2) only exploitative learning, and (3) both exploitative and explorative learning. 
Without any learning, an investor’s current investment decisions are independent 
of the past investment history, i.e.  () ii hist SS    for some constants  i S . In this case, the 
estimated coefficients  1 E  and  2 E  are not statistically different from zero, and differences 
in i S  across the industries are captured by industry fixed effects. 
With pure exploitative learning, the investment decisions depend only on O , and 
not on the option value of learning, i.e.  () ( ) ii hist SS O    for some function  () i SO. This 
case arises when investors are unable to internalize the future value of learning, and their 
investments are determined entirely by the immediate returns. In contrast to the case 
without learning, an investor with successful past investments in an industry is more 
likely to continue investing in this industry, and the estimate of  1 E  is statistically greater 
than zero. However, the investment decisions are independent of the lengths of the 
investment histories, and the investor disregards the corresponding difference in the 
precision of the beliefs and option values of learning. For example, an investor who has 
made two previous investments in industry i, with one being successful, and fifty 
previous investments in industry j, with twenty five successes will be equally likely to 
invest in these two industries again, since  1
2 ij OO    .24
Finally, with both exploitative and explorative learning, for a given O , investors 
prefer investments in industries with shorter histories. Consider again an investor with 
two and fifty past investments in industry i and j. When  1
2 ij OO    , an investor who 
internalizes the value of future learning prefers to invest in the industry with the shorter 
history, since this industry presents a greater value of learning. For the investor to be 
indifferent between the industries, the industry with a smaller O  must also have a shorter 
history, so the additional value of learning compensates for the smaller immediate return. 
In contrast to the case with pure exploitative learning, the investor is indifferent between 
an industry with a greater value of O  and a correspondingly longer investment history 
compared to an industry with a smaller value of O  and a shorter history. In this case, the 
estimate of  2 E  is also statistically greater than zero. 
It follows from this argument that to identify exploitative and explorative learning 
from the observed investment behavior, the model implicitly compares the probabilities 
of investing in industries with similar magnitudes of O  but with different lengths of the 
past investment histories. The need to compare each investor’s investment decisions 
across industries with longer and shorter histories means that a fairly long overall 
investment history is required to make reliable inference about learning. Hence, it is 
necessary to exclude investors making less than forty investments from the final sample, 
and it is difficult to refine the analysis to learning with finer industry classifications 
without more data, since finer classifications means that the histories for each of the 
individual industries will be relatively shorter. 25
B. Choice of Prior Beliefs
The identification argument presented above shows that it is possible to separate 
behavior reflecting exploitative and explorative learning, taking the investors’ prior 
beliefs as given. These prior beliefs are unknown, and they are assumed to follow Beta
distributions, parameterized by a0 and b0. This distribution is more dispersed and less 
informed when a0 and b0 are smaller. When beliefs are more dispersed, the value of 
learning is greater, and this creates an inverse relationship between the two parameters 
and the value of learning.
The prior beliefs can be estimated separately, exploiting a restriction from the 
learning model. In principle, it is possible to impose this restriction and estimate the 
parameters jointly with the rest of the model, for example using maximum likelihood 
estimation; however, it would then be necessary to recalculate the option value repeatedly 
as part of the estimation procedure, which is numerically difficult. The bandit model 
generates the restriction that investors place equal weight on O  and Option Value, i.e. 
12 E E   . To impose this restriction, the model in equation (8) is estimated for different 
choices of a0 and b0, and the hypothesis  12 E E    is then tested. The prior beliefs are 
determined by the smallest values of a0 and b0 for which the hypothesis is not rejected.
**** TABLE II ABOUT HERE  **** 
Table II contains estimates of the model with a0 = 1 and b0 varying from 17 to 20. 
Each row contains estimates of  1 E  and  2 E , estimated with and without industry fixed 
effects, and the table also reports the p-values for a 
2 F  test of the hypothesis  12 E E   . It 26
is observed that  1 E  is largely constant across the specifications, and b0 and  2 E  are 
positively related, as expected. Intuitively, given the investment history, a larger value of 
b0 makes the initial beliefs more informed and the value of learning declines. Equation 
(8) must then load more heavily on the option value to explain the history and  2 E
increases correspondingly. With industry fixed effects, the hypothesis  12 E E    is not 
rejected for b0 equal to 19 and 20. Without industry fixed effects, the hypothesis is not 
rejected for b0 equal to 18 or 19. Taken together, a reasonable estimate of the prior beliefs 
is a0 = 1 and b0 = 19, and these beliefs are maintained below.
11 It is important to note that 
this procedure does not mechanically make  1 E  or  2 E  positive or statistically significant. 
The parameters a0 and b0 are chosen to make these two coefficients equal, but they may 
well be equal at a statistically small or even negative value. In fact, if the investment 
decisions were not explorative, they would not depend on the option value,  2 E  would not 
vary with the beliefs, and it would not be possible to make the two coefficients equal for 
any choice of prior beliefs. In this sense, the test of the hypothesis  12 E E    provides a 
general test of the overall fit of the model, and the model is not rejected. 
The prior beliefs imply that the initial value of  ,, Oijt equals 1/20 or 5%. This is 
low compared to the empirical success rate, but it is necessary to capture the persistence 
in the investments. The specification of  ,, Oijt reflects the investors’ beliefs about the 
success rate in untried industries. In reality, VCs probably believe that they are 
11 For the choice of prior to be as uninformative as possible, either a0 or b0 must equal 1. The specifications 
reported in table II have a0 = 1. In unreported estimates of specifications where b0 = 1 and a0 varies, the two 
coefficients are not found to be statistically equal.  27
particularly skilled investors in certain industries and focus their investments here. The 
initial expected success rate would then be larger for these industries, and to capture this 
difference in initial beliefs the model is also estimated using each investor’s ten initial 
investments to “burn-in” their beliefs, without including them in the further estimation. 
This leaves the results (unreported) largely unchanged, although the statistical 
significance decreases somewhat due to the discarded observations. The model is also 
estimated with industry fixed effects to capture differences in beliefs across industries. 
Finally, note that it is natural for O  to be below the empirical rate, even with perfectly 
rational expectations. The realized rate is calculated from the actual investments, and 
these are made in the industries where the investors expect the highest returns. In 
contrast, O  is the expected success rate across all industries, including those industries 
where the investor does not invest. In other words, if O  were equal to the empirical 
success rate, the option values of new untried industries would lead the investors to shift 
to those industries after investing in any industry and realizing the empirical success rate. 
With this specification, the model would be unable to explain the persistence in their 
investments.  
IV. Empirical Results 
Estimates of five different specifications of equation (8) are reported in table III. 
The first specification is the baseline specification from table II. Across all specifications 
the coefficients on both  ,, ijt O  and  ,, ijt Option Value  are positive and significant. Not 
surprisingly, investors exploit and prefer industries with a higher expected immediate 28
return (i.e.  1 0 E ! ), but investors also explore and invest in industries with a greater value 
of learning (i.e.  2 0 E ! ).
**** TABLE III ABOUT HERE **** 
The additional specifications control for other factors that may affect investment 
decisions. Although not part of the formal model, investors may learn from other 
investors and from public market signals. Specifications 2 and 3 include additional 
controls for the total number of VC-backed IPOs and total number of VC investments 
during each year in each of the six industries. These general trends appear to have small 
but positive and significant effects on investment decisions, and this is consistent with 
Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2005) who document that investors follow 
public market signals. However, including these additional controls does not eliminate 
the effects of  ,, ijt O  and  ,, ijt Option Value , and after controlling for the general trends in the 
market, the investors still internalize the value of learning from their own investments, as 
specified by the learning model.
Specification 4 includes the investors’ experience in individual industries 
(Industry Experience), calculated as the total number of past investments the VC has 
made in each industry. This captures other factors, besides learning, that may lead VCs to 
focus their investments in industries where they have longer investment histories and 
more experience. One may imagine VCs “entrenching” themselves in an industry, 
perhaps to enjoy wider access to the deal flow, regardless of the outcomes of their past 
investments. Alternatively, since industry experience is inversely correlated with option 
value (a greater experience leaves less scope for learning), this variable may capture 29
misspecifications of the learning process. If these were severe, the multicollinearity 
arising when including Industry Experience would reduce the statistical significance of 
the estimated coefficients. However, the results in table III show that the coefficients on 
O  and Option Value remain positive and significant when this variable is included, 
consistent with the model.  
Specification 5 is a kitchen-sink regression that includes all regressors. The 
variable Previous is a binary variable that equals one for the industry of the investor’s 
previous investment. This captures additional persistence in investment decisions. For 
example, if investors only partly update their beliefs between investments, they would be 
more likely to invest in the same industry again, and the coefficient on Previous would be 
positive (conversely, if they spread their investments across industries before they update 
their beliefs, it would be negative). Overall, the positive and significant coefficients on 
Industry Experience and Previous reveal that there is some element of persistence that is 
unexplained by the model. The positive and significant coefficients on Industry IPOs and 
Industry Investments show that investors follow general trends in the market and public 
market signals. However, after controlling for all these additional determinants of the 
investments, the coefficients on O  and Option Value remain positive and significant, 
confirming that learning is a significant determinant of investment decisions.  
To investigate further implications of the learning model, table IV reports 
estimates of a Probit model where the outcome of each investment is a function of the 
investor and market characteristics. Specification 1 is the baseline specification. The 
results show that investments with higher O , higher Option Value, and in late-stage 30
companies are more likely to be successful. In the learning model, O  measures the 
investor’s expected immediate success probability. The positive and significant 
coefficient reported in table IV shows that this measure captures a reasonable amount of 
the actual success probability, and indicates that the investors’ beliefs specified in the 
model are not unreasonable. The model also predicts that exploratory investments, which 
are made mainly for their option value, should have lower success rates. In other words, 
an investment that is attractive because O  + Option Value is large should only have a 
success rate of O , and Option Value should be a weaker predictor of success. Note that 
this is not a formal prediction of the model. If investors systematically underestimate the 
value of untried industries, investments with higher Option Value will have better 
realized outcomes. Still, the coefficient on Option Value provides a test of the model and 
the beliefs. Specification 2 includes industry controls and controls for the investor’s 
experience, and the significance of Option Value decreases substantially. Finally, 
specification 3 is a kitchen-sink regression with a number of additional controls for 
market conditions and investor experience. In this specification the statistical significance 
of Option Value vanishes entirely, but the significance of O  remains largely unchanged, 
consistent with model.  
**** TABLE IV ABOUT HERE *** 
A. Investment Strategies and Outcomes 
The model has further implications for success rates across investors. It implies 
that investors that explore and learn to a greater extent should have higher success rates, 
and to confirm this relationship the model is estimated separately for each investor. For 31
this estimation, the value of an investment in industry i, by investor j, at time t is 
specified as 
,, ,, ,, ,, , 1 , , 2 ,, 1 ijt ijt ijt ijt j jt j ijt v OptionValue OptionValue IndustryIPOs OJ J H ªº      ¬¼ .(10)
Here, the bracket contains the immediate return plus the option value, i.e. the Gittins 
index. The second term is option value in excess of the value in the bracket, and investors 
with positive  ,1 j J  exhibit more explorative investment behavior than predicted by the 
model. Finally, the coefficient  ,2 j J  classifies the investment behavior according to how 
closely it follows general trends in the market, here measured by Industry IPOs.
12 A 
higher value of  ,2 j J  corresponds to an investor that follow these trends to a greater extent. 
One slightly unusual feature of this specification is that the scale of the equation is 
normalized by fixing the “coefficient” for the first term (in the bracket) to equal one. 
Usually, for discrete choice models, the scale is normalized by fixing the variance of the 
error term. However, by normalizing the term in the bracket it is possible to estimate the 
standard deviation of  ,, ijt H , and the corresponding coefficient, denoted  j V , measures the 
“randomness” or “opportunism” of the investor’s behavior. This normalization also 
makes the estimated coefficients comparable across investors. With the standard 
normalization, the randomness is captured by the scale of the coefficients, and an investor 
making more random investments would have smaller coefficients in absolute value. This 
12 The results (unreported) are largely similar when general trends are measured using Industry Investments.32
would make coefficients difficult to compare across investors, and this alternative 
normalization eliminates this problem. 
On a technical note, the model is estimated by first estimating a standard Logit 
model and then rescaling the coefficients using the value of the first coefficient. The 
standard error of the first coefficient provides a measure of how precisely the 
characteristics of the investor’s strategy are estimated, and for investors with shorter 
investment histories the coefficients are estimated less precisely. To adjust, the investors 
are weighted according to the precision of the estimates of their characteristics, with less 
weight placed on investors with less precise coefficients. One disadvantage of this 
method is that a small number of investors have negative estimates of the first coefficient 
of the model. These are typically investors with short investment histories and 
imprecisely estimated characteristics. However, these investors will appear to have 
negative values of  j V , which is difficult to interpret. Since these investors have low 
weights, all the results are robust to excluding them as well as replacing  j V  with its 
absolute value. 
In short, the model is estimated separately for each investor and classifies their 
investment strategies along three dimensions. An investor with a higher value of  ,1 j J
places more weight on option value and explores more. A higher value of  ,2 j J  reflects an 
investment strategy that follows overall market trends to a greater extent. Finally, the 
coefficient j V  measures the standard deviation of the error term and a higher value 
corresponds to an investment strategy that is more “random” or “opportunistic.” To form 
meaningful units of these measures, they are rescaled to have a standard deviation equal 33
to one in the sample. Panel B in table I presents both the scaled and raw estimates of 
these measures. 
First, consider the relationship between a VC’s performance and investment 
behavior. Here, performance is measured using Success Rate, which is the investor’s 
fraction of successful investments to total investments, and the estimates of the following 
regression are reported in table V.
0, 1 1, 2 2 3 j jj j j SuccessRate E JE JE V E H       (11) 
A positive estimate of  1 E  indicates that investors that explore more by placing more 
weight on Option Value have higher success rates. A positive estimate of  2 E  indicates 
that investors that follow general trends more have higher success rates, and a negative 
estimate of  3 E  indicates that investors that make more random investments have lower 
success rates. 
**** TABLE V ABOUT HERE *** 
In the first specification in table V, panel A, investors with higher J ,1 j  have higher 
success rates, consistent with the model. An investor that explores more discovers more 
successful investments and realizes a higher success rate. The greater propensity to 
explore may be a result of more dispersed prior beliefs or a higher discount factor (a G
closer to one), leading to a higher value of learning. Alternatively, the explorative 
behavior may be a result of suboptimal investment decisions, but even in this case 
“excess” exploration should lead to a higher success rate. Suboptimal excess exploration 34
still lead the investor to discover more successful investments, but these successes are 
realized further in the future, lowering their discounted present value. However, Success
Rate does not adjust for the timing, and more exploration leads to a higher Success Rate
in this case as well. Next, the coefficient on Standard Deviation shows that investors with 
a higher V j have consistently lower success rates, suggesting that investors who deviate 
more from the learning model or make more “random” or “opportunistic” investments are 
less successful. The magnitudes of the effects of Option Value and Standard Deviation
are economically meaningful. A one standard deviation increase in exploration (within 
the sample of investors) is associated with a 2.14 to 2.62% increase in success rate, and a 
one standard deviation in the “randomness” is associated with a 1.60 to 2.40% drop in 
success rate. Compared to an average success rate of 50.3% in the sample, these are 
meaningful economic effects.  
In table V, panel A, the second specification also includes  ,2 j J , which measures 
the investors’ tendency to follow general trends in the market, here measured by the 
number of VC-backed IPOs in each industry in each year. The coefficient is positive but 
insignificant, suggesting that the relationship between investors’ performance and their 
tendency to follow the market is weak. Specification 3 also includes the total number of 
investments by the investor (Final Experience),
13 and the estimated coefficient is positive 
but insignificant. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find that more experienced VCs make more 
13 The difference between Final Experience and Total Experience is that Final Experience is calculated 
once for each investor at the end of the sample. Total Experience is calculated at the time of each 
investment and increases through the sample period. 35
successful investments, but the evidence here is less conclusive, perhaps due to the right-
truncation of the sample, making Final Experience a noisy measure. Alternatively, it may 
be due to the different outcome measures used by Kaplan and Schoar (2005). 
The outcomes of the individual investments provide a finer view of the learning 
process. Panel B in table V reports the coefficients for a Probit model where the outcome 
of each investment is estimated as a function of the investor’s strategy and additional 
controls. The empirical specification is 
 ,, 0 1 , 1 2 , 2 3 ,, 4 Pr( 1) ijt j j j ijt Success X E JE JE V E E c    )     . (12) 
The first specification shows that investments by more explorative investors are 
more successful, and investments by more “random” or “opportunistic” investors are less 
successful. This confirms the above evidence from the investors’ success rates, and the 
economic effects are meaningful here as well. A one standard deviation increase in  1, j J
corresponds to an increase in the success probability from 1.48 to 3.35%, and a similar 
increase in  j V  corresponds to a decrease in the success probability of 2.12 to 2.99%. The 
second specification includes the measure of the investor’s tendency to follow the 
market, but this effect is again small and insignificant. The final specification is a 
kitchen-sink regression with additional controls and fixed effects. Not surprisingly, 
investments in companies at the late stage are 15.14% more likely to be successful, and 
this effect is statistically significant. Further, investments by more experienced investors 
are marginally more likely to be successful and investments in industries with more VC-
backed IPOs are marginally less successful, which is consistent with Kaplan and Schoar 36
(2005). Overall, the results at the investment level supports the evidence at the investor 
level, although the sign on  2,j J  reverses in the last specification. 
B. Investment Speed 
The model also has implications for the timing of the investments, and the 
empirical evidence provides additional support for the model. There are several possible 
hypotheses. Investors may initially make slow explorative investments, and if these 
investments are successful, accelerate to benefit from their informational advantage. 
Alternatively, investors may make a string of quick initial explorations, perhaps to 
capture first-mover advantages, and then continue at a more measured pace. While the 
model does not explicitly incorporate investment speed, it provides a simple way to 
investigate this relationship. In the model, speed is determined by the discount factor. The 
closer G  is to one, the smaller is the discounting, and the higher the speed. As a starting 
point, assume that increasing the speed requires costly effort. This may reflect the cost of 
searching for new investments or investing in lower quality companies and working 
harder to improve them. The investor’s problem is now 
> @ () () , (( ) ) m a x[ ( ) | () ] () () ( ( 1 ) )| () , () st st e VFt Ey t Ft Ce eEVFt Ft st G     . (13) 
Here e is effort,  () Ce is an increasing convex cost of faster investing, and  () e G  is the 
discount rate, which tends to one as effort increases. This extended model predicts that 
when the continuation value increases (the last term in equation (13)), the benefit of a 
higher speed also increases, regardless of whether the continuation value reflects a higher 
value of learning or a higher immediate return.  37
This is confirmed empirically. The coefficients of the following OLS regression 
are reported in table VI. 
,, 0 ,, 1 ,, 2 ,, ijt ijt ijt ijt Time Gittins X E EE H c     . (14) 
Time is the number of days since the investor’s previous investment, and a longer time is 
equivalent to a slower speed. To control for investments that are made simultaneously, 
the sample is restricted to investments that are made at least fourteen days apart.
14 In this 
sample, the average of Time is 80.8 days with a standard deviation of 126. The variable 
Gittins represents the continuation value, given by the investment’s Gittins index.
15
In the first specification in table VI the coefficient on Gittins is -119.85. As 
predicted, investments with greater values are made faster. Specification 2 includes 
industry and year controls, along with the investor’s total experience. Again, more 
valuable investments are made faster, and more experienced investors are also found to 
invest faster, although the magnitude of this effect is smaller. 
**** TABLE VI ABOUT HERE *** 
In specifications 3 and 4 the option value and the immediate return enter separately. The 
model predicts that both coefficients should be negative with similar coefficients, but in 
specification 3 the sign of the coefficient on Option Value is positive. However, in 
14 The regression results are similar when all the investments are included, but the hazard model described 
below has problems estimating the hazard rates for investments that are very close. 
15 Formally, the continuation value is the Gittins index scaled by a factor, see i.e. Whittle (1982) (p. 214). 
Notice that a formal solution to this problem would adjust the continuation value to capture the expected 
future speed and its cost. This problem is not solved here. 38
specification 4, when including year and industry controls, both coefficients become 
negative, although their magnitudes are still somewhat different. The larger negative 
coefficient on Option Value suggests that investors make explorative investments faster, 
perhaps to capture first-mover advantages or for other reasons outside the model.  
Finally, the investment speed can be captured by a hazard model. In table VI, 
specifications 5 and 6 report estimates of a Cox hazard model and the results are 
consistent with the results from the previous specifications. Note, for the hazard model, 
coefficients greater than one reflects an increase in the hazard rate, corresponding to a 
shorter time between the investments (and corresponding to a negative coefficient in the 
OLS regressions). Again, more valuable investments are made quicker, and this effect is 
observed for both investments with higher immediate returns and higher option values of 
learning.
Overall, the evidence confirms that more valuable investments are made faster. It 
is noteworthy that the option values and expected immediate returns are calculated 
independently of the timing of the investments, and the results provide independent 
supporting evidence that the Option Value and O  measure meaningful economic aspects 
of the value of the investments, as perceived by the investors when deciding where and 
how to invest. The option value of learning plays a significant part in this decision. 
V. Summary and Conclusion 
This paper demonstrates that VCs learn from past investments and anticipate to 
learn from future ones. When the distributions of payoffs from investments are uncertain, 39
but the outcomes of the investments are informative about these distributions, the return 
from each investment is both its immediate return and an option value of learning. To 
empirically test for the presence of learning, the paper presents and estimates a learning 
model based on the multi-armed bandit model. It is shown that the index result
dramatically simplifies the estimation and identification of this model, and the empirical 
approach based on this result may be applicable for investigating learning in other 
situations. 
The empirical evidence confirms that learning is important, and the two 
alternative hypotheses, that (1) VCs do not learn, and (2) VCs learn only from past 
investments and do not internalize the value of future learning are both clearly rejected in 
the data. VCs exhibit exploitative behavior by changing their investments in response to 
the outcomes of past investments to benefit from higher immediate returns. Further, VCs 
exhibit explorative behavior by directing capital towards new unproven investments and 
internalizing the option value of the information gained from these investments. The 
model generates further predictions that are confirmed empirically. In the cross-section, 
VCs with more exploratory investment strategies have greater success rates, and VCs 
making more random investments have lower success rates. Further, more valuable 
investments are made faster. These findings are consistent with the model, and 
corroborate the economic interpretation of the measures of the immediate return and 
option value of learning derived under the model.  
The presence of learning has potentially important implications for understanding 
the market for VC financing and the organization of VC firms. A theoretical literature 40
shows that informational frictions arise in markets with learning and informational 
spillovers. The two main frictions are a free-rider problem and an informational 
cascading problem. These frictions reduce the investors’ incentives to explore, and this 
reduces the equilibrium level of learning below the first-best levels. However, VCs are 
private investors in privately held companies. This organizational form reduces 
informational spillovers and may allow VCs to internalize the value of exploration and 
promote learning to a greater extent than traditional investors in more transparent capital 
markets. This ability to allocate capital to more explorative investments may present an 
additional source of value created by these investors.
One potential refinement of the analysis is to separate learning at the industry 
level from learning at the finer level of the individual technology or business idea. The 
analysis is consistent with learning taking place at all of these levels, but an explicit 
separation of these various kinds of learning would sharpen the understanding of the 
learning process and its implications for the market. The main challenges are data 
availability and computational issues. With a finer classification of learning, there would 
be fewer investments within each category. Since the statistical identification is based on 
comparisons of investments in categories with similar immediate returns but different 
lengths of investment histories, longer overall investment histories would be required for 
sufficient variation in the lengths of the histories across categories. In addition, narrower 
classifications may also lead investments in one category to be informative about 
investments in related categories, and the index result may have to adjust for this 
information structure, making the analysis more numerically challenging.  41
Finally, Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein (2005) demonstrate that 
changes in economic fundamentals, as signaled by public market signals, are important 
determinants of VC’s investments. The analysis here suggests that there are two kinds of 
changes in economic fundamentals that can make new investments attractive. An 
investment becomes attractive when either its immediate return increases (an upward 
shift in F(t)) or when its option value increases (an increase in the “spread” of F(t)). An 
increase in the immediate return may follow from an improvement of a known product, 
for example through an investment in a project that reduces its marginal cost. This project 
would generate an immediate return, but it may have a small option value of learning. In 
contrast, an investment in a new and unproven technology typically has a low immediate 
return but a substantial option value, since a successful implementation of the technology 
would spur further investments in other applications. While standard capital markets are 
well suited for allocating capital in response to the first kind of change, the analysis 
suggests that VCs may be better able to internalize the option value of learning and this 
would make them better suited for allocating capital is response to the second kind of 
change. Casual empirics suggests that VCs invest primarily in entrepreneurial companies 
with new technologies and high option values, and formalizing the difference between 
standard capital markets and institutional investors in their abilities to internalize value 
and allocate capital in response to various economic changes would help understand their 
complementary roles in the economy.42
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TABLE I: Summary Statistics
PANEL A: Summary Statistics By Company          
 Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
IPO  6,076  0.170  0.376 0 1 
Acquisition  6,076  0.329  0.470 0 1 
Success (IPO + Acq)  6,076  0.499  0.500  0  1 
Year  6,076  1995.2  4.422 1987 2000 
         
Industry  Classifications         
Health  6,076  0.181  0.385 0 1 
Commmunications  6,076  0.208  0.406 0 1 
Computers  6,076  0.240  0.427 0 1 
Software  6,076  0.175  0.380 0 1 
Consumer  6,076  0.122  0.327 0 1 
Other  6,076  0.074  0.261 0 1 
         
PANEL B: Summary Statistics by Investor          
         
 Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
IPO  Rate  216  0.204 0.094 0.000 0.523 
Acq  Rate  216  0.299 0.067 0.106 0.492 
Success  Rate  216  0.503 0.118 0.133 0.864 
Total Experience  216  88.731  64.210  40  577 
         
Classifications of investment  strategy:       
Option Value  216  2.762  27.551  -80.801  226.649 
Standard Deviation  216  0.292  0.608  -4.213  4.640 
Industry IPOs  216  0.002  0.016  -0.172  0.056 
Normalized  scale:         
Option Value  216  0.100  1.000  -2.933  8.226 
Standard Deviation  216  0.480  1.000  -6.933  7.634 
Industry IPOs  216  0.115  1.000  -11.040  3.602 
                 
PANEL C: Summary Statistics by Investment 
         
 Obs.  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Experience 19,166  68.081  73.230  1  577 
Stage  19,166  0.287  0.452 0 1 
Year  19,166  1995.2  4.542 1987 2000 
Success 19,166  0.571  0.495 0 1 
Lambda 19,166  0.260  0.153 0.032 0.717 
Option Value  19,166  0.062 0.012 0.019 0.082 
Gittins Index  19,166  0.323 0.147 0.063 0.745 
OptionValue / Gittins Index  19,166  0.252 0.138 0.031 0.531 47
TABLE I: Summary Statistics (cont.)
Panel D presents the number of VC investments and VC backed IPOs (in 
parenthesis) for each industry in each year in the sample. 
PANEL D: INVESTMENTS (IPOs) PER INDUSTRY PER YEAR 
             
Year     Health  Comm  Comp  Cons  Soft Other     Total 
1987      806  420  1,125 164 359 310      3,184 
    (3)  (2)  (4) (0) (0) (2)      (11) 
1988   592  237  770  92  327  208     2,226 
    (4)  (4)  (5) (1) (1) (4)      (19) 
1989   395  148  371  57  189  139     1,299 
    (11)  (1)  (7) (4) (4) (5)      (32) 
1990   283  101  256  56  196  89     981 
    (11)  (4)  (10) (1) (6) (4)      (36) 
1991   258  100  164  57  206  54     839 
    (45) (11)  (14) (2) (8) (3)      (83) 
1992   372  152  142  44  257  58     1,025 
    (59)  (15)  (18) (11) (11)  (6)      (120) 
1993   357  159  123  74  163  57     933 
   (35)  (14)  (36)  (9)  (18)  (15)      (127) 
1994   338  176  159  65  189  36     963 
   (33)  (13)  (27)  (6)  (16)  (6)      (101) 
1995    445  240  191 134 280  86      1,376 
   (40)  (17)  (30)  (5)  (33)  (6)      (131) 
1996    472  429  291 176 458  93      1,919 
    (72)  (35)  (28) (16) (43) (13)      (207) 
1997    621  533  391 269 633 124      2,571 
   (39)  (18)  (21)  (9)  (17)  (10)      (114) 
1998    688  723  426 410 739 231      3,217 
  (9)  (23)  (16)  (9)  (11)  (2)      (70) 
1999   844  1,938  1,055  1714 1,249  175     6,975 
    (14)  (94)  (27) (53) (68)  (3)      (259) 
2000   961  2,824  3,443 1,388 1,034  359     10,009 
      (60)  (44)  (29)  (32)  (48)  (8)     (221) 
Total     7,432  8,180  8,907 4,700 6,279 2,019     37,517 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































TABLE IV: Investment Outcomes 
The table reports marginal effect from estimates of a Probit model where the outcome (success or failure) 
of each investment is the endogenous variable. Lambda and Option Value are investors’ expected 
immediate return and option value of investing. Industry Investments is total number of investments in each 
industry per year across all investors in the data. Industry IPOs is the number of companies in the same 
industry going public in the year of the investment. Industry Experience is the past number of investments 
by the investor in the industry and Total Experience is total number of the investor’s past investments 
across all industries. In the third specification, investors initial ten investments are discarded from burn-in. 
Robust standard errors with clustering at the company level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
   1     2     3    
Lambda  0.3631 ***  0.3544 ***  0.6668 *** 
  (0.0368)   (0.0541)   (0.0772)  
Option  Value  3.1726 ***  1.0309 *  0.5607  
  (0.3975)   (0.5772)   (0.6615)  
Stage  0.1656 ***  0.1601 ***  0.1726 *** 
  (0.0141)   (0.0142)   (0.0147)  
Industry  Experience    -0.0032 ***  -0.0037 *** 
     (0.0008)   (0.0098)   
Total 
Experience      0.0004 ***  0.0008 *** 
     (0.0001)   (0.0002)   
Industry  IPOs        -0.0004   
        (0.0004)   
Industry Investments        0.0000   
        (0.0000)   
log(Industry Experience +1)        -0.0363  ** 
        (0.0159)   
log(Total Experience +1)        -0.0397  *** 
        (0.0159)   
          
Year  Controls  Yes   Yes   Yes   
Industry 
Controls  No   Yes   Yes   
                   
Observations  19,166     19,166     17,006    51
TABLE V: Investment Strategies and Outcomes 
Panel A shows estimated coefficients for an OLS regression. An observation is an investor and the 
endogenous variable is the investor’s success rate. Panel B presents marginal effects estimated from a 
Probit model. Each observation is an investment in a company and the endogenous variable is the outcome. 
Option Value, Standard Error, and Industry IPOs characterize the investor’s investment strategy in terms 
of its dependence on option value, its standard error, and on the number of VC backed IPOs in the industry 
in the same year. These coefficients are normalized to have standard error equal one (see text for details). 
Total Experience measures the number of previous investments by the investor at the time of each 
investment. Final Experience is the investor’s experience at the end of the sample. Stage is an indicator 
variable that equals one for investments in late-stage companies. Observations are weighted according to 
the precision of the estimates (see text for details). Robust standard errors with clustering at the company 
level are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
PANEL A: Success Rate of Venture Capital Firms 
  1     2     3    
 Coef.  Std.  Err.     Coef.  Std.  Err.     Coef.  Std.  Err.     
Classification  of  Strategy             
Option  Value  0.0214 (.0027)  *** 0.0234 (.0087)  *** 0.0262 (.0089)  *** 
Standard  Deviation -0.0160 (.0022)  ***  -0.0212 (.0071)  ***  -0.0240 (.0080)  *** 
Industry  IPOs       0.0085  (.0112)   0.0086  (.0117)   
                
Final  Experience            0.0001  (.0001)   
                
Constant  0.5432 (.0044)  *** 0.5441 (.0094)  *** 0.5285 (.0126)  *** 
                
Observations  216     216     216    
                             
PANEL B: Success of Individual Investments 
  1     2     3    
 dF/dX  Std.  Err.     dF/dX  Std.  Err.     dF/dX  Std.  Err.     
Classification  of  Strategy             
Option  Value  0.0335 (.0058)  *** 0.0148 (.0060)  *** 0.0154 (.0060)  *** 
Standard  Deviation -0.0299 (.0062)  ***  -0.0242 (.0075)  ***  -0.0212 (.0076)  *** 
Industry  IPOs        0.0029  (.0094)   -0.0013  (.0095)  
                
Stage            0.1514  (.0157)  *** 
Total  Experience            0.0001  (.0001)   
Industry  IPOs            -0.0002  (.0005)   
                
Year  Controls  No     Yes     Yes    
Industry  Controls  No     No     Yes    
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